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A real world network pricing game with less
severe Braess’ Paradox
Abhimanu Kumar ⋆ and Sanjib Kumar Das⋆⋆
Abstract. Internet and graphs are very much related. The graphical
structure of internet has been studied extensively to provide efficient
solutions to routing and other problems. But most of these studies as-
sume a central authority which controls and manages the internet. In
the recent years game theoretic models have been proposed which do
not require a central authority and the users are assumed to be routing
their flows selfishly. The existence of Nash Equilibria, congestion and the
amount of inefficiency caused by this selfish routing is a major concern
in this field. A type of paradox in the selfish routing networks, Braess’
Paradox, first discovered by Braess, is a major contributor to inefficiency.
Several pricing mechanisms have also been provided which give a game
theoretical model between users(consumers) and ISPs (Internet Service
Providers or sellers) for the internet.
We propose a novel pricing mechanism, based on real world Internet
network architecture, which reduces the severity of Braess’ Paradox in
selfish routing game theoretic networks. It’s a pricing mechanism between
combinatorial users and ISPs. We prove that Nash equilibria exists in this
network and provide bounds on inefficiency . We use graphical properties
of internet to prove our result. Several interesting extensions and future
work have also been discussed.
Key words: Combinatorial users, Selfish routing , Game theoretical
pricing mechanism, Congestion games, Braess’ Paradox, Nash Equilibria,
Price of Anarchy, Potential Functions, Convex and Concave Functions,
Splittable and non-Splittable Flows
1 Introduction
Internet has grown meteorically in the few decades and thus the amount of study
associated with it. The graphical and combinatorial properties of internet have
been studied in great deal. Several interesting graphical properties have been
derived with experimental results [1] . The earlier studies assumed a central
authority for the internet for ease of analysis . But today’s Internet is more of
an autonomous system without any central authority where users and the ISPs
work selfishly to maximize their own interests. Because of this behavior there has
been growing concerns about QoS (Quality of Service), finding efficient routes,
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pricing mechanisms etc. Since each user or ISP is selfish and works for his own
interest without any concern for the overall efficiency of the system, a game
theoretic approach to this problem looks to suit much better. Based on these lines
there has been a growing amount of research literature in theoretical computer
science about analysis of the inefficiency due to selfishness of the agents (users
and ISPs) of the system. Several models have been suggested [2,3]. Roughgarden
et. al [4] study the inefficiency arising due to Braess’ Paradox, first discovered by
Braess [5] and later reported by Murchland [6]. To combat the ills arising due to
selfishness like congestion etc. several pricing mechanisms have been suggested
in[7,8,9] but the effectiveness of these rely on the owner of the resources i.e the
ISP. The ISPs are selfish and their goals may not align with social objectives
of efficiency and QoS. There is also vast amount of research which proposes
pricing mechanisms so that the resources of the ISPs can be effectively sold
to the users[10,11] keeping in mind the selfish behavior. But all of these either
assume a constant cost function for the edges charged by ISPs or analyze their
models for cases when each user routes a negligible amount of flow for ease of
analysis, or assume a kind of coordination between different users.
In selfish routing games the main aim of the user is to minimize its latency
cost (delay). It does not worry about the cost charged by the ISPs. Several
researches [4,8] have studied this kind of game giving bounds on Price of Anarchy
which measure the inefficiency arising due to selfishness. In Network Design
games the main aim for the users is to have a network which will let them
flow their required flows with some pricing mechanism, it’s not concerned about
congestion delays. This game has also been the focus of attention of several works
[2,3]. Here the job of the ISPs is to just provide the network with the minimal
price, generally a constant cost per edge, without themselves(ISPs) having any
selfish motives. It’s just the user who has selfish motives. Obviously none of the
above mentioned games capture the full complexity of the network. We provide
a model which takes both the ISPs and the users to be selfish and the user cost
function has both the factors: the latency as well as cost charged by the ISPs,
which is not always constant.
We give a model which captures a real world general case network scenario,
where the price of the edges,charged by ISPs, in the network varies with amount
of flow. The idea behind this assumption is that the per unit flow cost charged by
seller decreases if the buyer buys more. i.e. if you buy in bulk you pay less per unit
cost . Our cost function also includes the latency factor that is latency caused
due to congestion in the network edge. In this model we assume combinatorial
users (buyers) and their flow is not negligible. Each user has a significant amount
of flow . Also we assume that the flow is non-splittable. This complicates the
situation a lot. Our model can easily be extended for negligible and splittable
flow cases as well. We prove that the effect of Braess’ paradox is less severe in
our model. We give a better bound of the worst case of Braess’ Paradox. We
also prove that the Nash Equilibria exists in our model.
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1.1 Related Work
Hayrapetyan et. al [10] analyze among similar lines as us but for their cost
function they assume a constant term for the per unit flow price charged by
ISPs but in the real world scenario generally the per unit charge decreases if the
flow required by the user increases i.e. ISPs provide concession for more flow.
Our model captures this. They have not done any analysis of the effect of Braess’
Paradox in their network, too. We show that in our model the severity of Braess’
Paradox is reduced.
1.2 Model and Notations
Our network is a multicommodity flow network i.e. it has more than one source-
target pair. This model is similar to the model discussed in [12] with an added
term for unit cost function for the price charged by ISPs. Let us consider a
directed graphG = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of Edges.
There is a set of k source and target(sink) pair of vertices (s1, t1), (s2, t2)...(sk, tk)
and a set of k users who want to use this network for their flow between a (si, ti)
pair. Each (si, ti) has a corresponding user i and vice-versa . Each user i has a
flow fi > 0 .Different players can have identical source sink pair. Πi is used to
denote the set of (si, ti) paths of the network for a given i. Each user for (si, ti)
pair picks a path P from the set Πi for its flow and thus f
i
P > 0 and equals 0 for
all other paths. Thus the strategy set for user i is Πi. The condition that the
flow is 0 for all other paths is termed as the non-splittable flow routing. And as
we see the number of users is combinatorial , this condition is termed as Atomic
Selfish Routing [12]. A flow f is a feasible flow for this network if it corresponds
to a strategy profile : for each player i , f iP equals ri for exactly one path P for
si − ti where ri is the total amount of flow player i has to send.
Fig. 1. shows the cost function of the edge between the vertices u and v
Π is the union of all the sets Πi i.e. Π =
⋃k
i=1Πi. Every edge e has cost
tie(fe) for each user i, t
i
e : R
+ → R+, and fe is the total flow amount in the edge
e i.e. fe =
k∑
eǫP :PǫΠ:i=1
f iP . The cost function t
i
e contains contains two terms. One
is a term for congestion C(f) and another is a term U(f) that ISPs charge for
the flow of user i f iP in that edge where eǫP . Thus te(fe)i = C(fe) + U(f
i
P ) =
ce(fe)+ue(f
i
P ) for user i for using edge e. Note that ce() is the eth component of
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Function C() or ce() is the e’s contribution to the cost function C().We can say
that Te(x) is the total cost of all the user for edge e i.e. te(x) =
k∑
i=1
t(xe)i.Note
that te(xe)i will be 0 for users i for edge e who dont route their flow through e.
The first component of the cost function tei is defined as ce : R
+ → R+ . This is
dependent upon the total flow x in the edge . We consider only those Ce which
are convex with respect to flow x . So for the time being lets take Ce(x) = x.
The Second term of the cost function tei is defined as u
i
e : R
+ → R+ . This
function is the per unit flow charge of the ISP for the edge. This function will
be of the form F (fi)/fi where F (fi) is the charge for the total flow fi of the
user i by the ISP and thus the per unit cost of routing the flow for the user i
will be F (fi)/fi. You can note that the congestion term is independent of user
i , because even if the user doesn’t contribute to the congestion it confronts the
congestion of the edge caused by all the users.
Now we define the concept of equilibria in this model. As we know the users
are selfish so they will all try to minimize their cost . Let us define the cost of a
path P with respect to a flow f in terms of the sum of the costs for constituent
edges: tiP (f) =
∑
eǫP
tie(fe) =
∑
eǫP
(ce(fe) + ue(f
i
P )).
Definition 1. (Equilibrium Flow) Let f be a feasible flow for the network
G(V,E) . The flow f is an equilibrium flow if, for every player iǫ{1, 2, ...., k} and
every pair P, P˜ ǫΠi of si − ti paths with f iP > 0
tiP (f) ≤ tiP˜ (f˜) (1)
where f˜ is the flow identical to f except that f˜ iP = 0 and f˜
i
P˜
= ri
Now we define the Social cost in our network. Social cost is the total cost ex-
perienced by all the users in the network. i.e.
k∑
i=1
(total cost of each user i)
Formally Social Cost SC(f) for the flow f is defined as
Definition 2. (Social Cost) Given the network instance (G,r,t) where te =
ce + ue (i.e. cost has two components) and ri is the amount of flow with each
user i with f the flow in the network. Then social cost SC(f) is
SC(f) =
∑
eǫE
ce(fe)fe +
k∑
i=1
∑
eǫPi
ue(ri)ri (2)
Informally when you calculate the sum of the cost of all the k users in the
network we arrive at equation (2) .Next we define Price Of Anarchy of the
network. This term was defined for Social Cost of the network and is used to
measure inefficiency arising in the network flow due to selfish users . It was first
conceptualized by Papadimitriou et.al [2] and Anshelevich et.al [3] Our definition
is the same as used by Roughgarden et.al in [12].
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Definition 3. (Price of Anarchy) In the network instance (G,r,t) as above
Price of Anarchy POA is the ratio of the social cost in the worst case equilibrium
flow f and that of the optimal flow f∗ .So
POA =
SC(f)
SC(f∗)
(3)
1.3 Our Results
1. We show that for our model there always exists a pure Nash Equilibria even
in the case of Combinatorial Users with non-splittable flows in real world
network scenarios.
2. We show that the severity of Braess’ Paradox is reduced in our case . The
previous bound on Braess’ Paradox was 4/3 given by Roughgarden et. al. [4]
.Our bound is 8/7 in the worst case. We also show a trivial result that if the
Unit Cost function term is the dominant term compared to the Congestion
Term in the Cost Function then the Braess’ Paradox doesn’t even exist for
the original graph given by Braess [5] which is also used by Roughgarden for
the 4/3 bound.
3. We give bound for Price of Anarchy for our model
1.4 Paper Organization
From here on we discuss the existence of pure equilibria in our model. Then in
the next section we prove the reduced severity of Braess’ Paradox. After that We
give bounds on Price of Anarchy for our model. In the last section we conclude
our work with some open problems and opportunity for future work.
2 Pure Equilibria Existence In the Model
We prove the existence of pure equilibria in our model using the potential func-
tions. This method was suggested in [12]. Our potential function is different from
theirs .Potential function is a function which captures the changes in the cost
of network very effectively when any user deviates from a network state or flow
condition. We will use a discrete combinatorial potential function. The idea be-
hind this combinatorial function is that it has finite values so there must exist a
minimum value among those values. This minimum is what we are interested in.
We make our potential function such that it depicts the change experienced by
a user deviating from the equilibria. And hence we prove that we have attained
a state of equilibria.In the following theorem we are going to define the proof of
the existence of equilibria.
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Theorem 1. (Equilibrium in the network) Let (G,r,t) is a network instance
where every user i has an amount ri to flow and the cost function is t as defined
in earlier sections in the given graph G. Then (G,r,t) has at least one equilibrium
flow given that the congestion factor in the t is an affine function.
proof Note that we took that the congestion factor in the t an affine function
as an affine function is a fair estimate of congestion in a real world network.
We design a potential function to capture our network model. As defined in
the previous section our cost function t has two components. Let us formally
define our cost function. The cost function tie is the amount of per unit flow cost
experienced by user i by flowing ri amount of flow on edge e which lies on path
P chosen by i out of Πi. t
i
e = ce(fe)+ue(ri) . Here as defined earlier fe =
∑
iǫSe
ri .
Where Se is the set of users whose path has edge e. Now we define our Potential
function Φ as
Φ =
∑
eǫE
(
ce(fe)fe +
∑
iǫSe
ce(ri)ri
)
+
∑
iǫSe
ue(ri)ri (4)
Having defined the potential function for our network we use its features to
prove our result. Since the network instance has finite users and each user has
finite strategies, thus there are only finite number of flows and correspondingly
finite number of values for our potential function. Say for a flow f the potential
function has the minimum value. We prove that this corresponds to the equilib-
rium flow. We prove it by contradiction. Let us say that this flow f is not the
equilibrium flow. That means by switching its path a user i can strictly decrease
his cost. Let the previous path was P for that user and the new path is P˜ . Now
change in the cost of i is:
0 > tP˜ (f˜)− tP (f) =
∑
eǫP˜\P
(ce(fe + ri) + ue(ri))−
∑
eǫP\P˜
(ce(fe) + ue(ri)) (5)
Now let us look at the change in the potential function because of the change
in user i ’s strategy. As we know that ce(fe) is an affine function so it can be
written as aefe + be
Φ =
∑
eǫE

ce(fe)fe +∑
iǫSe
ce(ri)ri

 +∑
iǫSe
ue(ri)ri
Rewriting the underlined term in the above equation we get
ce(fe)fe +
∑
iǫSe
ce(ri)ri = (aefe + be)fe +
∑
iǫSe
(aeri + be)ri
=
(
ae
∑
iǫSe
ri + be
)∑
iǫSe
ri +
∑
iǫSe
(aer
2
i + beri)
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= ae(
∑
iǫSe
ri)
2 + 2be
∑
iǫSe
ri + ae
∑
iǫSe
r2i
= 2ae
∑
iǫSe
r2i + 2ae
∑
i,jǫSe,i6=j
rirj + 2be
∑
iǫSe
ri
So Φ can also be written
Φ =
∑
eǫE

2ae∑
iǫSe
r2i + 2ae
∑
i,jǫSe,i6=j
rirj + 2be
∑
iǫSe
ri

+∑
iǫSe
ue(ri)ri
Now the change ∆Φ in the potential function because of the change in user
i ’s strategy is:
∆Φ =
∑
eǫP˜\P
(
2aer
2
i + 2aerife + 2beri + ue(ri)ri
)− ∑
eǫP˜\P
(
2aer
2
i + 2aeri(fe − ri) + 2beri + ue(ri)ri
)
= 2ri

 ∑
eǫP˜\P
(ae(fe + ri) + be + ue(ri))−
∑
eǫP˜\P
(ae(ri + fe − ri) + be + ue(ri))


=⇒ ∆Φ = 2ri

 ∑
eǫP˜\P
(ce(fe + ri) + ue(ri))−
∑
eǫP\P˜
(ce(fe) + ue(ri))

 (6)
The bracketed term in the right hand side of this equation is same as equation
(5). Thus this means that ∆Φ < 0 which contradicts our assumption that f gives
the minimum value for Φ. Thus f is the equilibrium flow for instance (G,r,t).
⊓⊔
3 Braess’ Paradox with Reduced Severity
In this section we show that our network model reduces the severity of Braess’
Paradox. Braess’ Paradox is most conspicuous in the following graph, fig(2).
This graph is used by Roughgarden et.al [12] to give the 4/3 bound of anarchy.
Assuming that the total flow of all the users is one unit and there are N users
where N is very large,in the graph in fig(2a), at equilibrium the flow is evenly
distributed between the two paths i.e.each path has 1/2 units of flow. Thus the
cost experienced by each user i is 3/2 per unit flow. We feel intuitively that
addition of the zero cost directed edge v → w should decrease the cost , but
when we add the path any user i uses the path u→ v → w → t, because at any
stage if the flow in the path u → v → w → t was x then user i experiences 2x
unit cost which is less than 1+x unit cost in the other paths, But since every
user is selfish each one migrates to this path and thus x becomes 1.This makes
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Fig. 2. Effect of Braess’ Paradox in the Original network
the per unit cost experienced by each user 2. thus the ratio is 23/2 i.e. 4/3. This
is the worst case effect of Braess’ Paradox. This was the bound i.e. that any
addition of edge can increase the network cost by atmost 4/3.
Now let us consider our network in fig(3).
(a) Initial Network (b) Augmented Network
Fig. 3. Effect of Braess’ Paradox in the new network
In fig(3a) we have cost function tie =
ce(fe)+ue(f
i)
2 where ue(f
i) = Fe(f
i)
fi and
Fe(f
i) is the cost charged by ISP from user i for flowing f i units. The logic
behind using this cost component ue(f
i) = Fe(f
i)
fi is that as the user purchase
more flow in the network edge the ISP gives it discounts. So the effective ue(f
i),
per unit cost flow, decreases with the increase in flow. This is what happens
in real world network pricing. We take the congestion cost term ce(x) to be a
linear function i.e. ce(fe) = fe. First lets have a look at the unit cost function
ue(x) = F (x)/x. Since the whole network is normalized i.e. total flow is 1, cost
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for edges s → w and v → t is 1 there is no loss of generality in assuming that
for a flow ε, F (ε) is ε where ε is very small i.e limε→0F (ε) = ε and the value of
F (ε+ δε) < ε+ δε i.e. limx→0(u(x) =
F (x)
x ) = 1 . We have plotted the graph of
some such functions like sinx and log (1 + x) in fig(4) against graph y = x for
comparing how the marginal cost for a flow δX decreases as the X increases. So
we have
x ≥ 0⇒ (u(x) = F (x)
x
) ≤ 1 (7)
Fig. 4. Unit Cost function plot
Now suppose there were N users each with 1/N units of flow with the total
flow in the network 1 unit, then in the graph of fig(3a) the total flow of 1 unit will
be divided into the two paths equally with each user flowing 1/N units and the
per unit cost experienced by any user i is 1 + ce(1/2)+ue(1/N)2 = 1+ (
1
2+
Fe(1/N)
1/N
2 ).
Now with the addition of the zero cost directed edge in fig(3b) any user i uses
the path u→ v → w → t, because at any stage if the flow in the path u→ v →
w → t was x then user i experiences 2(x+
Fe(1/N)
1/N
2 ) unit cost which is less than
1+(
x+Fe(1/N)
1/N
2 ) unit cost in the other paths as shown below:
From Equation (7) we have
1/N ≥ 0⇒ Fe(1/N)
1/N
≤ 1
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⇒ Fe(1/N)
1/N
+ x ≤ 1 + 1 = 2 As x ≤ 1
⇒ 2(Fe(1/N)
1/N
+ x) ≤ 2 + Fe(1/N)
1/N
+ x
⇒ 2(
x+ Fe(1/N)1/N
2
) ≤ 1 + (
x+ Fe(1/N)1/N
2
)
That is what we wanted as the result. So the user i chooses path u → v →
w → t but since every user is selfish each one chooses this path and thus increas-
ing cost. Thus at equilibrium the cost to the user is (1+ Fe(1/N)1/N ) and the ration
between the new cost and the old cost i.e. bound ρ is
ρ =
(1 + Fe(1/N)1/N )
(1 + (
1
2+
Fe(1/N)
1/N
2 ))
=
4 + 4Fe(1/N)1/N )
5 + 2Fe(1/N)1/N )
(8)
Since Fe(1/N)1/N ) ≤ 1 , thus the worst case value of ρ is 4+45+2 = 8/7
⊓⊔
Now let us have a normalized generic te that is te = c1ce + c2ue where
c1 + c2 = 1 and c1, c2ǫ[0, 1], putting c1 = c2 = 1/2 we get our original cost
function. After doing the calculations we find that ρ for this is
4(c1+c2
Fe(1/N)
1/n )
2+c1+2c2
Fe(1/N)
1/N
.
Now in this equation if c1 (congestion coefficient) becomes 0 and for worst case
we substitute Fe(1/N)1/n = 1 then we arrive at ρ = 1. Thus proving our claim that
Braess’ Paradox vanishes. Also if in this equation if c2 (cost coefficient) becomes
0 then we arrive at ρ = 4/3 the original bound by Roughgarden [12] .
⊓⊔
4 Price Of Anarchy bound
The price of anarchy bound for our network is 3+
√
5
2 ≈ 2.618. Its same as the
bound given for Atomic Selfish Routing in the book [12]. See Appendix for the
proof.
5 Conclusion, Discussions and future Work
So we conclude with the result of reduced Braess’ Paradox. And one can easily
see that our model can be extended for the negligible and splittable non-atomic
case as well. Our model opens several interesting future research perspectives.
1. In what other game theoretical models can this buy in bulk and get discounted
phenomenon be applied to. For examples problems like resource allocation
etc.
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2. The effect of this model on undirected graphs.
3. It will be interesting to see how addition of another term say QOS(Quality
of Service) affects the equations.
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Appendix: Price Of Anarchy bound
Formally if (G,r,t) is a network instance in which te’s congestion term is an
affine function then the price of anarchy can be at most 3+
√
5
2 . Let f be the flow
in the network at equilibrium and if f∗ is the optimal flow of the network which
minimizes its SC(social cost) as defined in earlier sections. If user i was using
path Pi in f and P
∗
i in f
∗ then∑
eǫPi
((aefe + be) + ue(ri)) ≤
∑
eǫP∗i
((ae(fe + ri) + be) + ue(ri)) (9)
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where ri is user i ’s flow. This equation comes from the equilibrium flow
condition, definition(1). Now given the same network instance and flows as for
equation(9) We have
SC(f) =
k∑
i=1
ri
(∑
eǫPi
aefe + be + ue(ri)
)
≤
k∑
i=1
ri

∑
eǫP∗i
ae(fe + ri) + be + ue(ri)


≤
k∑
i=1
ri

∑
eǫP∗i
ae(fe + f
∗
e ) + be

+ k∑
i=1
ri

∑
eǫP∗i
ue(ri)


=
∑
eǫE
f∗e (ae(fe + f
∗
e ) + be) +
k∑
i=1
ri

∑
eǫP∗i
ue(ri)


= SC(f∗) +
k∑
i=1
ri

∑
eǫP∗i
ue(ri)


⇒ SC(f) ≤ SC(f∗) +
∑
eǫE
aefef
∗
e (10)
Using Cauchy-Schwartz Inequality we see that
∑
eǫE
aefef
∗
e ≤
√∑
eǫE
aef2e
√∑
eǫE
ae(f∗e )2 ≤
√
SC(f)
√
SC(f)
Combining the above result with equation(10)we arrive at the following in-
equality
SC(f)
SC(f∗)
− 1 ≤
√
SC(f)
SC(f∗)
(11)
As we know SC(f)SC(f∗) is our POA defined in definition(1.2). Thus solving in-
equality(11) gives us
POA ≤ 3 +
√
5
2
⊓⊔
